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SOME people might say that Comte and Spencer had no rehgions.
It

is

certain that they

had no

theologies.

x\nd yet these two

remarkable prophets of the age of science were
earnestness, and each thought that he had a religion.

men

of

great

Each consid-

own faith to be, not only true and reasonable in itself, but
improvement on Christian orthodoxy, and quite adequate
But what
to satisfy the legitimate cravings of the human soul.
could be stranger than the contrast between the religious outlooks
of these two thinkers outlooks so much more incompatible than
ered his

a great

;

their respective systems of philosophy?

Their philosophic systems are indeed very different, and yet
in common.
They agree with one another and with the

have much
writings

of

J.

position,

in

a

S.

Mill,

who

occupies

a

somewhat intermediate

determined attempt to bring philosophy into

with science, to found

it

anew on

strictly scientific data, to

line

limit

^
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Sons) and the "Inquirer's Library," together with many original books, mark
Its
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logical point of view.
Anatomy of Knozvlcdge (1906) which leads up to a somewhat novel classification of the sciences; and Common Sense (1913), in which he endeavors
to give a psychological analysis of common sense and a discussion of its bearMr. Hooper is an ardent advoings- on theories of knowledge and causation.
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International Parliament, advocating a permanent and representative international council.
A modification of his earlier suggestions, in the light of
the present crisis, is given in a pamphlet entitled The Wider Outlook Beyond

the
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recognized knowledge to the relations of phenomena and banish
speculation on the older metaphysical and theological lines.
Both are dominated by the idea of a progressive and generally
ascending process of change in the universe, and both apply this
idea, though in different ways and with somewhat varying results,
to the growth of human knowledge and civilization. These two thinkers were alike engaged in creating the science of sociology, although
they could not foresee, and we cannot foresee, its ultimate develall

opments.

There

are,

however, some outstanding

sophic method, which

which

ligious outlook to

chologist

—a

may
I

diff'erences

of

philo-

partly account for the differences of re-

must shortly

allude.

Spencer was a psy-

student of the changeful combinations of sensation,

thought, emotion, and desire, as they appear in the diurnally re-

newed flow
ciple,

Comte eschewed psychology on prinmade from the
humanity rather than from that of the individual

of conscious

life.

regarding knowledge as a subjective synthesis

point of view of

He

thinker.

common

accordingly

instrument of

all

with logical

started

human

inquiries,

discourse

as

the

and with the "positive"

method of employing this instrument.
Again, Spencer was a strong individualist in sociology, while
Comte was an ardent collectivist. Lastly, Spencer was bent on
applying a single mechanical law of evolution throughout the various spheres of natural

unbridged

(if

knowledge

;

while Comte emphasized the

not unbridgeable) diff'erences between the points of

view of the chief sciences. According to him each of the transifrom mathematics to physics, physics to chemistry, chem-

tions

istry to biology, biology to sociology, if not also that

from

sociol-

ogy to ethics, involves the bringing in of fresh data, with a new
and higher scientific outlook. The top rung of his "ladder of the
sciences"— the moral or moral-sociological point of view
is that
from which he habitually looks forth.
Let us now glance at Comte's religion, with its characteristic
differences from Christian orthodoxy on the one hand and abstract ethicism on the other.
It is clear that we have no positive
knowledge of individual objects higher in the scale of being than
men and women but human persons dift'er enormously in physique, in mental endowment, and in moral character, so that the

—

;

highest individual object
as such, but

human

we

what we take

can conceive

is

not a

to be the best type of

human

— or

being,

the ideal

being.

Most Christians suppose

that Jesus, the Messiah,

was

a morally
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man, and there are some rationalizing Christians who hold
humanity constitutes his whole title to divinity. For
Comte, however, Jesus was simply one of the great and good reformers of morals and religion who have, from time to time, appeared in the world. His character, like that of every one else,
was partly due to his natural ancestry, and partly due to the human
environment and circumstances into which he was born, and to
which his thoughts and feelings reacted more strongly and fruitfully than those of a lesser man would have done.
All men and women of historical eminence are moulded in
mind and character (though not independently of their own conscious activity) by the social influence of their contemporaries but
they are also powerfully afifected by that of their forerunners,
through the standard literature and traditions, and the creations
of art and industry, to which they have access. The really valuable
and permanent elements of culture, which are passed on from
century to century and extended from nation to nation, are a
product not solely of the more celebrated individuals with whose

ideal

that his ideal

;

names many of them are connected. They are also a result of
the upward strivings of the great mass of human beings who think
not only of what concerns themselves, but also of what is good for
Very many of these people contribute
others or for all men.
directly to the common stores of knowledge, art, and practical
wisdom, without attaining notoriety and all of them exercise a
;

subtle influence

best that

in

is

From

in

spurring the greater geniuses to achieve the

them.

these

and

like considerations

Comte arrived

ception of a Great Being, Humanity, which

is

at the con-

not merely the col-

human individuals, but the efficient unity
men and women who have ever striven, however vaguely,
the common good. The dead still cooperate with the living in

lective multitude of living

of
for

all

producing one great and growing historical fact: the collective life
of the nations to whom the earth belongs, headed by those powerful

West who inherit the science and art of Greece, the
and moral codes of Rome and Judea.
Humanity, taken in the above sense, is certainly the most
directly beneficent thing of which we have any clear knowledge
for its far-reaching and persisting influence is compact of the

nations of the
legal

varied achievements of

all

great personalities as well as of the

unobtrusive goodness of the multitude whose names are forgotten.

Comte, therefore, sought to institute a worship of this Humanity,
which we know positively though imperfectly, in place of the wor-
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ship of a God whom, according to him, we do not know at all.
And, be it said, this religion of Humanity may be valid in its way
and may survive in essence, even if the elaborate ritual with which
Comte sought to surround it, and which caused it to be humorously
described as Catholicism minus Christianity, cannot or should not
be put into practice. The small bodies of positivists who look up
to him as their spiritual master have among them thinkers who are
by no means incapable of criticizing and setting aside some of his
teaching, while

it

belongs to their avowed ideal to accept the later

advances in science and practice which the continued progress of
humanity must bring to light.
If

Comte considered himself, and is considered by his followers,
founder of a new era in human civilization, it must not be

to be the

forgotten that his whole teaching precludes the idea of there being
any miraculous prophet or sage whose authority ought to outweigh
the growing experience and science of mankind.
It will, I think, be admitted that, while humanity, taken in its
is morally the grandest thing we know, human
and folly, human vindictiveness and depravity, are the
worst things knowable and we have only too much evidence of their
existence.
Hence some people think that, if a strictly natural re-

essential solidarity,
selfishness

;

ligion be possible, it should be a religion of pure ethics
not of
humanity as such, but of what we are convinced is good in human
character and social relations
no matter whether this good be
destined to triumph in the dim future or to be swallowed up in
;

;

the tragedy of a deteriorating world.

To
it

this heroic type of ethicism a positivist

might object that

the general consensus of enlightened opinion which causes

is

and certain motives to be recognized as good, and
Humanity, rather than the indiwith his possibly and quite probably prejudiced type of

certain conduct

other conduct and motives as bad.
vidual,

conscientiousness,

is

the arbiter, because

Moreover, there would be

little

could not feel that mankind
of true

from

his

human

it is

the maker, of morality.

inspiration for ethical religion

is in

betterment; that the passions which

animal ancestry, and

still

if

we

fact progressing in the direction

man

more perhaps from

inherits

the ages of

tyrannical force, ruthless predatory warfare and savage superstition,
are indeed being brought under the strong control of rational and

humane

sentiments, expressed in juster laws and better relations

between individuals,

classes,

and nations.
*

*

sit

Comte's doctrine of Humanity has made a much wider appeal
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to

modern thought than

inal followers.
theistic

those

is

evidenced by the small band of his nom-

has doubtless exercised a powerful influence upon

It

and Christian thinkers who are not too orthodox while, for
longer believe in a superhuman providence or a divine
;

who no

who do believe in the gospel of human advancement,
becomes an increasingly inspiring idea.
Many, however, cannot accept the religion of Humanity at
Comte's own valuation, because, while they are willing at times to
stand beside him on the top rung of the scientific ladder, and view
everything from the moral-sociological standpoint, they like also
to view things from some of the lower rungs which, strange to say,
give glimpses of a universe altogether greater than humanity
greater by the immensities of time and space by endless process
and limitless substance by boundless potentialities of form and
revelation, but
it

;

;

motion,

life

humanity

They

and consciousness.

the child of savage races

is

animal ancestry

;

that, of

discover that self-conscious
;

these the offspring of an

more primitive types

of life

;

also that all

are children of mother earth, and earth dependent on the sovereign

Thus, while they

sun and conditioned by the all-enfolding ether.

may

recognize that the slowly integrating being of Humanity, ever

striving

toward the good,

is

the thing most worthy to be worshiped

all veneration from those mysterious
and organic progress which have undoubtedly been necessary, even if they have not alone sufficed, to make
humanity all that it is, and all that it may become. To venerate
them as though they were human and moral would be mere anthropomorphism but not to venerate them at all seems to disclose a

with love, they cannot withhold
sources of energy,

life,

;

somewhat narrow

attitude of self-satisfaction in

human

achieve-

were still in the womb of
primitive nature, conscious only of itself and caring nothing for the
mother who is to bring it forth whereas, the relative independence
of pre-sociological conditions which man undoubtedly possesses
argues his ability to reflect on pre-sociological nature, and to see
that it is indeed his mother and deserves some at least of his
ments.

It is

as

if

the child, mankind,

;

reverence.

When we have learned to forgive nature for not being human
(which many people seem unable to do) we shall perhaps begin to
revere her for being what she is. This attitude might seem more
consonant with the robust monism of Professor Haeckel than with
Spencer's austere doctrine of the Unknowable and yet that doctrine undoubtedly assert? the value of an ultimate reality which is
;

not specifically human.
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of the universe which meant

little

to

Comte's predominantly social spirit meant much to Spencer. He
came to suppose that science and religion might be ultimately reconciled in the recognition of a great First Cause or Inscrutable Absolute

;

a reality underlying at once the facts of consciousness and the

facts of matter in motion, but not to

yet with both taken together at their

be identified with

either,

nor

His

re-

phenomenal value.

modern sphinx-worship but be it said without sarcasm; for the sphinx was a profoundly symbolic monProbably I am not alone in thinking that where he erred
ster.
ligion

thus a sort of

is

objectifying the pervading mystery of being under such

was

in

titles

as Cause, Power,

radically

known

;

;

and Absolute, and supposing that

it

contrasts

with a sphere of phenomena which can be definitely
whereas the very fact of knowing, in the true or intellec-

and judgments to
some object-matter with which they are not commensurate; something which they mean but do not equate with or substantially re-

tual sense, involves a relation of subjective ideas

semble.

The mystery

of being

seen to lurk in

is

all

those things

phenomena, and even in the simplest sensations,
when we try to understand them in their manifold real relations,
and do not satisfy ourselves with the familiarity of their names, as
though this familiarity were true knowledge of them.
It is fairly certain that the chapters on the Unknowable in
Spencer's First Principles do not appeal strongly either to persons
There are,
of religious or to persons of scientific temperament.

that are called

however, various incontrovertible truths contained in those chapters, and if Spencer had contented himself with showing how many
of the questions which men formulate are verbal rather than con-

and had preached, instead of the Inscrutable Absolute, that
which knozvledge is ever more nearly approximating, hut which thought can never fully represent, many who
withhold assent from his doctrine as it stands would have freely
gone along with him.

ceptual,

Infinite Reality to

To

the Christian believer, or to any believer in supernaturally-

grounded

religion,

Comte and Spencer must of
is, however, from the point
and as making an appeal to the

the religions of

course both seem unsatisfactory.

It

of view of purely natural religion,
rationalist rather than to the

orthodox that they have

to be seriously

considered.

Now
if

it

may be

that the majority of rationalists are in fact,

not in profession, secularists

;

that they do not

want

a natural
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any more than they want a revealed, religion. Certain rationalists,
however, do feel that the individual soul should learn to link itself,
Some,
in love and reverence, with realities greater than itself.
while others, who may be not less
therefore, become positivists
zealous for human progress, reserve their religious emotion for
what transcends humanity for what they may, with Spencer, regard as the unknowable Absolute, or may view simply as the
stupendous encompassing and indwelling mystery of nature. Each
of these sorts of natural religion seems to me somewhat one-sided.
Why should not the rationalist seek to unite the intimate worship
of Humanity, as the most intensively beneficent reality known to
him, with an imaginative veneration of that infinite Nature, in
which the life of humanity has not only its external setting but its
very being? Certainly there is a sense in which these two objects
of reverence may seem opposed. Nature contains so many forces
hostile to man and entails on man so many elements inimical to true
humanity. But man himself is after all a part of nature, and the
highest excellence of individual and social life can only be attained
in and through nature.
The superiority of man to his subhuman
surroundings is not a superiority to that Reality which embraces the
;

;

subhuman and human alike.
Thus nature is not essentially, though

it may be accidentally,
Moreover, there is a third object of
possible natural religion to be considered; one which is identical
neither with nature nor with humanity, but is instrumental to our
knowledge of both. Whatever we realize either of humanity or of

human

inimical to

ideals.

nature over and above those inarticulate feelings for the good and
the beautiful which are best expressed by music and the fine arts,

form of connected and mutually supported
described by the familiar word reason.
This reason is not simply reasoning, still less is it mere arguing
it is just the clearest understanding and the truest judgment of
which we are personally capable. It is the circle of subjective ideas
and opinions which at once link up with one another and reach out
to an objective goal; be that some object of contemplation or of
passive feelings evoked by contemplation, or be it some practical
achievement which the moral sense approves and to which rational
is

realized

in

thoughts which

that

is fairly

reflection points the

A truer

way.

appreciation of humanity, a fuller conception of nature,

a humbler sense of that part of natural reality which
present knowledge, a better ability to serve
utilize the

mankind

lies

beyond

socially or to

knowledge of physical forces for human good are

all
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dependent on an increase of individual understanding, which
can be brought about only by training the person to think as
alike

widely and earnestly, as carefully and impartially, as possible. Such
thinking, or exercise of reason, necessarily mediates between self

and humanity, self and nature, and even in some sense between
nature and humanity themselves. Must we not therefore consider
reason as being closely linked with these,
term in the supreme natural trinity?

third

deserve to be in some sort venerated?

True,

greatest objects

its

Does not reason
it

;

a

also

does not possess the

moral dignity, the social fulness, and the inspiring appeal of humanity nor does it possess the infinite sublimity and manifold wonders
and charms of nature; but what were humanity and nature to us
without it? Simply nonentities!
;

I would therefore suggest that a reasonable religion for the
avowed rationalist is to venerate Nature, as the supreme but never
wholly revealed reality to love Humanity as his own higher self
and highest end to reverence Reason as the essential means to the
;

;

best that he can either think or do, and, in
to the best conditions that

humanity

If natural religion can exist at

itself
all,

complement of advancing knowledge.

may

limitations of reason
to

be inquired into

ments

in

;

be, there

is

it

its

collective exercise,

can achieve.
can only exist as the

Whatever the

inevitable

nothing too high or too sacred

provided the inquiry be, not a pursuit of argu-

favor of some foregone conclusion, but a sincere quest

marked by

modify our old
and clearer understanding.
A religion of Reason can be approved only if it hearten us
to an ever-increasing exercise of the thing itself. The actual hard
work of scientific observation, experiment and induction, of scholarly research, and of logical rearrangement of ideas should of course
be undertaken in the mood of the workman, not in that of the
Moreover those persons who, without pretending to be
devotee.
original investigators, would learn in broad outline what has actually
been ascertained as to the constitution of nature and the history
of mankind must be workmanlike in their studies, more especially
as there is, under our present system of education, a lamentable
dearth of sound instruction on these most important subjects.
We must really know something of the wonders of evolution,
cosmic and biological, and of natural law, before the sublime mystery of Nature can become an object of religious feeling. We must
form some fairly distinct mental picture of the world-history of
which British history is only one comparatively modem and Amer-

of truth,

willingness to relinquish or

beliefs in the light of stronger evidence
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ican history a

much more modern

section, before the ideal-ward

Humanity, which has moulded all that is worth
living in our lives can become for us a great and imperious reality.
It is, however, when we clearly perceive what an absurdly
small distance can be traveled by personal knowledge toward conceiving the infinite reality of Nature or measuring the essential
goodness and greatness of Humanity that natural religion may
well arise to supplement natural knowledge, without in any degree
striving spirit of

supplanting scientific investigation or the patient learning of

its

results.

How much

of that religion should take the

form of ceremonial

observance, or at least of the gathering together of like-minded
worshipers, and

how much

is

best left to the individual soul or

(which usually tends to view
Nature and Humanity with true reverence, and may be expected to
grow increasingly religious in this sense) is a question worth asking, though I shall not here attempt to answer it.
to individual expression in poetry

